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COMMENTS ON PAPERS DELIVERED BY
PROFESSOR HERZOG AND MR. EBB
DANIEL A. SOBERMAN*

It is often said that the European Communities are unique, that they
cannot be fruitfully compared to other institutions, whether international or federal. Certainly, to a common law lawyer they appear to
be uniquely civil law creations; their solutions to various problems
appear novel to him. Despite differences in approach much is to be
learned by comparing or at least contrasting the European approach
with that of the common law. Professor Herzog has well illustrated
some of the differences in his excellent paper on the Court of Justice.
I find three points in his paper particularly interesting. The first
concerns a problem to which different approaches are taken in the
common law countries themselves. Professor Herzog states that when
a private litigant brings an action before the Court of Justice he must
have an "interest" in a regulation or decision made by the community
-that is, that there must be an actual case or controversy as in United
States constitutional matters. I am not entirely convinced of the value
of this principle except when applied to private litigants. In some of
the newer federations and in Canada a method of "reference" to the
court by the attorney-general of the federal government or of one of
the provinces, is used to raise the validity of a statute or regulation.
Canada has had problems with constitutional judicial review, and too
often suffered from bad decisions, but the quality of the decisions does
not appear to be related to whether the case began as a "controversy"
or as a "reference." Besides, so many constitutional cases really start
as "test cases" in which the "interest" in the particular cause is trivial
that, in the end, they are hard to distinguish from references. The best
example in the Common Market setting is the now famous Costa case,
based on a three dollar electricity bill. It is worthwhile to note that
under the Treaties of Paris and Rome the executives and the member
states may make complaints without a specific controversy, and may
refer contested acts of a Community organ or of a member state
directly to the Court of Justice. Accordingly, while private litigants
must demonstrate an interest, the same rule does not apply to the major
institutions within the Community. They have rights similar to the
reference provisions in Canada and other federations.
* Professor of Law, Queen's University.
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Secondly, and more striking to a Canadian, is the use of economists
as expert witnesses in the Court of Justice. Canada pioneered in cartel
legislation; it passed its first anti-trust law a few years before the
Sherman Act. The law was primitive. Unhappily, it has remained so
to the present day, based as it is, on the criminal law jurisdiction of the
federal government rather than on jurisdiction over trade and commerce. Expert evidence by economists has been ignored by Canadian
courts, and as a result Canadian anti-trust legislation has been ineffective except in the most blatant cases. While the United States courts
have gone much farther in listening to such evidence, they still have
some way to go. It is difficult if not impossible to deny that evidence
of economic experts is indispensable in assessing offences under legislation that deals solely with economic matters. Of course, the EEC is
first and foremost what it says it is-an economic undertaking; for its
Court to refuse full weight to economic evidence would amount to a
denial of the Community's raison d'etre.
Thirdly, the Court of Justice is the Court for a community with
limited purposes; as a result it is a Court of limited jurisdiction thus
raising several interesting matters. First, a litigant must establish that
his case comes within the jurisdiction of the Court-and to do so he
must show among other things that the subject matter of the dispute
should be so classified as to fall within the scope of one of the treaties.
Yet despite the limited jurisdiction of the Court there is no superior
court of appeal. Accordingly the Court must exercise self restraint in
regulating its own jurisdiction. We might also note that its limited
jurisdiction is also a specialized one, much more so than a court of
general jurisdiction; it can develop more sophisticated procedures
designed especially to deal with its particular problems.
Mr. Ebb's paper contains the happy combination of difficult subject
matter discussed in language easily understood even by a novice in the
field of cartel law. He raises an interesting question, discussed at some
length by Leon J. DeKeyser in the December 1964 issue of the Common Market Law Review, whether the Grundig decision still leaves
room for development of a rule of reason with respect to exclusive
importer-distributor agreements, based on guarantee and post-sale
service requirements. A distributor of complex and expensive machinery might well not find it worthwhile to set up a distribution and service system without the security of an exclusive sales area. Otherwise,
he might find that after he has risked considerable capital and high
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overhead to maintain adequate servicing, an interloper without these
expenses is undercutting him and leaving him virtually as a serviceman.
I shall not venture into the merits of this problem, except to say that
Mr. DeKeyser does not believe all exclusive agreements will now be
held to offend the treaty. He suggests that there is still some room to
maneuver when a reasonable case can be made.
I should like to speculate upon the direction of EEC cartel law after
the Community achieves a common trademark law. With a market
roughly the size of the United States market, and with the possible
development of a rule of reason in this area of law, there seems to be
some probability that it may follow the United States in its attitude
toward exclusive importer-distributor agreements via-A-vis the rest of
the world.
Consten's cause of action against UNEF, unfair competition, seems
quite odd to a Canadian lawyer and I believe also, to a United States
or English lawyer. It appears to be repugnant to our legal theory that
an agreement between A and B (in this case Grundig and Consten)
can legally restrict the otherwise legal activity (selling electrical appliances) of C (UNEF)-unless, of course, there is specific statutory
provision creating a right in B and imposing a corresponding duty
upon C. Admitting ignorance on this aspect of French law, nevertheless I found the report of the decision in the French court virtually
incomprehensible on the point. While it is true that a deliberate interference with a contractual relationship may amount to a tort in the
common law, an incidental interference while carrying on an otherwise
legal activity for one's own purposes is not a tort.
A fascinating question raised by the Grundig case is whether it has
recognized a new tool for broadening the scope of Community review
of national law of the member states. The Grundig case aside, no
matter what approach one takes in examining the power of judicial
review under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, he must inevitably conclude that national courts-at least at present-control the extent of
Community review of municipal law. This state of affairs is best
illustrated by the French courts' use of acte claire to cut off remitting a
dispute on interpretation of the Treaty to the Court of Justice under
article 177. True, that article places a duty upon the national court to
remit a question of treaty interpretation to the Court in Luxembourg,
and a party may persuade the national court to do so; but if the
national court convinces itself that the meaning is clear and no interpre-
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tation by the Court of Justice is required, it can cut off any appeal. The
private litigant is helpless. We may agree that the national court has
made up its mind in complete good faith and yet be convinced that it is
wrong. But unless the Commission acts of its own accord and complains
of a breach of the Treaty under article 169, the breach will go unremedied. The Commission is so busy that it is highly unlikely it would
interfere of its own volition, except in an extremely important Community matter.
If, however, a private litigant can provide the motive force to get the
Commission started, by applying for a ruling on the validity of a
national law, and if in these circumstances a national court, that would
otherwise be unfavorable toward remitting a case to Luxembourg under
article 177, might now feel it had to await the Commission's decision
on the very same issue, then we should find that the Community's role
has to that extent been enlarged. Though the effect may be only
peripheral, that is, if only in a few doubtful cases where a national
court would be otherwise inclined it may now decide to await the decision of the Commission, the Community will to that extent be strengthened. Of course, this development is highly speculative, but even so,
the very fact that the private litigant himself can in some manner
appeal to a Community organ, as an alternative to passive acceptance
of a national court ruling, is in itself significant.

